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The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): 
China’s new multilateralism and the erosion of the West  
Thomas Renard 
China will launch a new development 
bank for Asia later this year, called the 
AIIB. 58 countries worldwide have 
already applied to become founding 
members, including numerous Western 
nations. This policy brief argues that the 
AIIB constitutes an important 
international development, as it reflects a 
new geopolitical reality and marks a new 
turn in China’s practice of 
multilateralism. It also looks critically at 
the European uncoordinated response to 
the AIIB, and what it tells about 
Europe’s shrinking role in the world. 
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A NEW BANK, BUT WHAT FOR? 
China announced its intention to create a new 
regional development bank in October 2013. 
Following a number of informal meetings and 
negotiations, a memorandum of understanding 
was signed by 21 countries one year later. 
Since then, more countries have applied to 
join the AIIB. On 31 March 2015 – the 
deadline for becoming a ‘founding member’ – 
58 countries had filed an application. 
 
By signing the memorandum of 
understanding, prospective members agreed 
on a set of core principles, notably with regard 
to the AIIB’s authorized capital of $100 
billion, with an initial subscribed capital of $50 
billion. They also agreed that GDP would be 
used as basic parameter to determine voting 
shares among members. Beijing was selected 
to host the headquarters, and an interim 
secretariat was designated. According to 
Chinese officials, the AIIB should become 
fully operational before the end of the year. 
 
Why did China set up the AIIB? Firstly, 
because it is needed. Asian countries badly 
need to develop their infrastructures – and 
China has plenty of cash to invest. According 
to one study of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the region would need more than $1 
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A new multilateral institution ‘for the twenty-
first century’. This is how the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
presents itself on its website. It certainly seems 
that way. This is a new Asian multilateral 
organization in the ‘Asian century’, initiated by 
the main rising power, China, but attracting 
most major powers worldwide, including 
European ones. At the same time, it is an 
initiative that is strongly resisted by the United 
States. As such, the AIIB is more likely to be 
an evolution than a revolution in global 
governance, but it reflects first and foremost a 
new geopolitical reality. 
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trillion annually over the next five years in 
order to meet its infrastructure requirements, 
only a fraction of which is currently available. 
The combined annual boost to Asia’s 
infrastructure from the World Bank (WB) and 
the ADB amounts to $20 billion. In this 
regard, the AIIB would complement existing 
resources, but it would still be very far from 
filling the gap. In fact, its confirmed capital 
amounts to just 60% of the ADB’s capital. 
 
Furthermore, the AIIB confirms and 
institutionalizes China’s rising role as a ‘new 
donor’. Over the past decade, and particularly 
since the economic crisis, Beijing has rapidly 
emerged as a significant donor and investor in 
various parts of the world. The vast majority 
of China’s development aid to the region and 
beyond is still channelled bilaterally, similarly 
to established donors. Although this is unlikely 
to change, China is clearly willing to increase 
its share of multilateral aid. It already 
contributes to the ADB’s and the WB’s 
capitals. In addition, China pushed recently for 
the launch of the BRICS Development Bank, 
which also has a capital of $100 billion. In 
each case, however, China appeared willing to 
invest more, but was limited by members’ 
reluctance to increase the institution’s capital 
or China’s share in it. The AIIB thus appears 
to be yet another vehicle for channelling 
Chinese money.  
 
Of course, China’s aid is not disinterested. In 
fact, according to Beijing, aid must always be 
‘mutually beneficial’. This can take the form of 
contracts for Chinese (state-owned) 
companies. Investments can also serve broader 
interests. It’s certainly true that China hopes 
that its money will buy influence. It is often 
said that China has no friends internationally, 
as illustrated by tensions with most of its 
neighbours. China has managed to antagonize 
many countries, but, on the other hand, it has 
also pursued very active diplomacy worldwide, 
with a view to broadening and deepening its 
global clout. In this regard, China’s booming 
economy is a clear asset. Through its 
development and investment policies, China 
hopes to deepen its influence in its 
neighbourhood and beyond.  
 
LIST OF APPLICANTS TO BECOME ‘FOUNDING MEMBERS’ OF THE AIIB  
(AS OF 31 MARCH 2015) 
 
ASIA-PACIFIC 
Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan, 
Vietnam.  
 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. 
 
EUROPE 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom. 
 
AMERICAS 
Brazil. 
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Finally, China’s new initiative cannot be 
dissociated from its dissatisfaction with its 
place in the existing multilateral system. 
Although China has now become the second 
largest economy in the world behind the 
United States, it remains largely 
underrepresented in the WB and the ADB, 
which are dominated by the United States and 
Japan respectively. In fact, the United States – 
and specifically the US Congress – has 
systematically resisted any significant reform of 
the WB and IMF structures. As a result, 
emerging powers such as China have 
increasingly questioned the legitimacy of these 
institutions, which in their eyes reflect a now-
vanished era dominated by the West. This has 
certainly encouraged them to consider 
alternative forms of multilateralism. 
 
A MULTILATERAL TURN? 
China is rarely described as a multilateralist 
power. Although it has joined most 
international organizations at the global and 
regional levels, China has been accused 
alternately of unfair practices (in the World 
Trade Organization or WTO, for instance), of 
blocking decisions (e.g., in the UN Security 
Council) or, more broadly, of practicing 
multilateralism à la carte by shifting selectively 
from bilateralism to multilateralism. China’s 
leading role in setting up the AIIB challenges 
this view to some extent. 
 
In all fairness, most nations worldwide practice 
multilateralism in a selective or flexible 
manner. Yet few would contest the idea that 
China’s authorities are less multilaterally 
minded than European governments. This is 
partly for historical reasons. Indeed, Europe 
opted for a multilateral approach to conflict 
resolution after World War II (WWII), with a 
number of organizations such as the European 
Communities, NATO or the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
This led to a long period of stability and 
prosperity on the continent, which is now 
being challenged somewhat. In contrast, Asia’s 
post-WWII security was largely based on 
bilateral deals, notably with the United States – 
the ‘hub and spokes’ system. A number of 
multilateral forums have been established over 
the past few decades to channel and mediate 
conflicts, but China remains largely at the 
periphery of this architecture. Asia is still a 
volatile continent where competition largely 
prevails over co-operation. 
 
Another equally important explanation for 
China’s view of multilateralism is a systemic 
one. The pillars of today’s multilateral order 
were built in the aftermath of WWII. They 
reflect an outdated balance of power, where 
China still has less voting power than the 
Benelux countries. At the same time, they also 
reflect Western norms and values, although 
this has generally benefited China by creating 
an environment conducive to its emergence. 
This largely explains why China has ambivalent 
feelings about the ‘liberal order’. As China was 
rising, it increasingly resisted some aspects of 
this liberal order that it perceived to be 
incompatible with Chinese norms and 
principles, resulting in demands for 
institutional reforms. The WB and the IMF 
were in China’s sights for a long time. 
Remarkably, however, these demands did not 
challenge the multilateral order. 
 
The AIIB could indicate a turning point in 
China’s approach to multilateralism. In recent 
years, China has started experimenting with 
alternative forms of multilateralism. In 2001, it 
launched a regional organization called the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
with Russia and Central Asian states, 
sometimes presented as China’s counterweight 
to NATO. In 2009, Beijing joined the BRIC 
forum with Russia, India and Brazil – South 
Africa joined later – the main purpose of which 
is to promote a more multipolar and less 
Western-centric order. However, these 
organizations have delivered very little so far, 
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and doubts persist with regard to their ability 
to grow into something more ambitious. 
Reasons include: internal tensions, China’s 
outright dominance, a largely reactive agenda 
and poor governance structures. 
 
However, the AIIB does not resemble the 
SCO or BRICS. To begin with, it is more 
inclusive, as its membership is open to all 
countries – even Taiwan. Furthermore, it 
presents a more positive and constructive 
agenda for co-operation between donors and 
recipients, but also among donors. This makes 
the AIIB more promising and attractive. At the 
same time, this attractiveness could become a 
challenge to the ‘liberal order’, particularly if 
the AIIB turns out to be a preliminary to an 
alternative China-led multilateral order.  
 
Until recently, China was largely perceived as a 
‘reformer’ of the multilateral system. With the 
AIIB and other initiatives such as the new 
BRICS Development Bank launched last year, 
China increasingly appears as a ‘soft 
revisionist’. It will continue to seek reform of 
existing multilateral structures, while setting up 
its own. Whereas a forum like BRICS has been 
essentially instrumental for pressuring 
established powers for multilateral reforms, the 
AIIB could be the first brick of a new Chinese-
led multilateral architecture. The ‘liberal order’ 
is still a long way from being supplanted by any 
serious alternative, but rules of co-existence 
will have to be negotiated. In this regard, one 
should welcome Chinese statements claiming 
that the AIIB will cooperate with ADB, WB 
and IMF, all of which expressed a similar wish 
in return. 
 
A GEOPOLITICAL TURN? 
China’s success in luring 58 countries (and 
counting) to the AIIB is remarkable. There is 
in fact no precedent for this. China has been 
recognized as a major emerging power for 
almost two decades now, but, for most of this 
time, its rise triggered mostly angst, fear and 
incomprehension worldwide. Beijing 
experimented with many strategies for 
dampening these fears – using rhetoric and 
cash – but its hard power continuously 
overshadowed its soft power. The AIIB could 
mark a turning point. 
 
The AIIB is perhaps China’s largest soft power 
success so far. To begin with, Beijing has 
shown that it is willing to take more leadership 
and responsibility in the region, in co-operation 
with regional and global players. This is 
weakening, at least temporarily, the accusations 
that China is an ‘irresponsible stakeholder’, 
although the new bank must obviously still 
demonstrate its effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
controversies surrounding the launch of the 
AIIB strengthened China’s position on the 
need for a multilateral reform. China not only 
weakened the argument of those claiming that 
it disregards multilateralism, but it also shed 
light on the negative role played by established 
powers, and specifically the United States, in 
resisting China’s legitimate demands for a 
greater role in the multilateral system. Above 
all, China has successfully divided the ‘West’, as 
American allies joined the AIIB one after the 
other. For once, it was the United States that 
found itself isolated globally, not China.  
 
With the AIIB, China engineered three major 
divisions in the ‘West’. First, most of the 
American allies in the Asia-Pacific such as 
Australia or South Korea accepted an 
invitation to join the new bank, despite 
American objections and lobbying efforts. This 
constitutes a major blow for Washington as it 
stages its much-advertised ‘pivot to Asia’. The 
US response is expected to come in the form 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 
regional free trade project that excludes China. 
Yet it remains uncertain whether this deal will 
come through at all. This could be yet another 
blow to the US pivot, perhaps even a fatal one.  
 
Second, the transatlantic partnership hasn’t 
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resisted China’s offensive either. The United 
Kingdom was the first European country to 
announce its willingness to join the AIIB. US 
officials complained that this happened with 
‘virtually no consultation’, accusing London of 
‘constant accommodation of China’. So much 
for the ‘special relationship’ between the 
United States and the United Kingdom. On 31 
March, 13 additional EU Member States 
announced their candidacy to the AIIB, 
including loyal transatlantic partners such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands, again despite 
insistent US pressures.  
 
Third, the EU itself reacted in a divided 
manner to China’s proposal. Only a few days 
after the British government announced its 
decision, France, Germany and Italy expressed 
their intention to join the AIIB as founding 
members. Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden also 
joined later. With only 14 EU Member States 
responding to China’s offer, in an apparent 
rush, it seems that there was no coordination 
on this important issue, proving once again to 
China how easily Europeans can be divided.  
 
The AIIB could be a Chinese success story in 
the long run, as the country shifts from hard to 
soft power, and from a negative narrative to a 
positive one. It is not only a result of China’s 
rising power, but also of China’s growing 
influence worldwide. China has shown a new 
ability to attract followers and to divide its 
opponents – even largely discrediting its main 
opponent, the United States. This could mark a 
major turning point in global power politics. 
But it will take China more than a new bank to 
undo decades of co-operation and partnership 
among Western nations. 
 
THE EU VS. THE AIIB 
The EU was divided in its response to the 
AIIB. Although 14 EU countries joined the 
AIIB as founding members, the position of the 
14 other Member States and of the EU itself is 
still unclear. Will they join later, and under 
what conditions? Or will they remain aligned 
with the United States? Above all, what can the 
EU achieve vis-à-vis China and the AIIB? 
Obviously these questions cannot all be 
answered yet. 
 
As a preamble, it should be noted that China’s 
lobbying to get Europeans on board – and the 
US lobbying against it – suggest that Europe is 
still a relevant player in global power games. Of 
course, Europe is no longer the centre of 
gravity of the international system, and there 
are no more ‘great powers’ in Europe – mostly 
small and smaller ones. However, Europe is 
still courted by major powers, although 
perhaps less and less for its resources and 
expertise than for the sake of legitimacy.  
 
In its weakness, Europe still has some power – 
but it must use what is left of it wisely. By 
joining the AIIB, EU Member States have 
offered significant legitimacy to the nascent 
institution, to the great pleasure of China’s 
leadership. But what did they get in return? 
Evidently, some of these countries plan to reap 
economic benefits from their decision. At a 
more strategic level, European support for the 
AIIB could be seen as part of a broader 
strategy to ‘multilateralize’ China, as European 
governments have long encouraged China to 
play a greater role in the multilateral system. 
China is an indispensable member of the 
multilateral system as a rising great power. 
Ensuring its commitment to multilateral 
principles could be the best strategy for a 
smooth power transition. Ironically, European 
overrepresentation in the multilateral system is 
the main cause of China’s underrepresentation 
and discontent with it. European membership 
of the AIIB is thus ‘cheap’ support for a 
multilateral China, dodging the issue of a 
broader multilateral reform.  
 
Some officials from EU Member States claim 
that their decision to join the AIIB was partly 
motivated by an ambition to shape and 
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influence the new institution from within. 
Indeed, there are numerous concerns and 
unknowns about the AIIB, notably with regard 
to its governance mechanisms, standards for 
projects (e.g., environmental) and 
complementarity with existing multilateral 
bodies. It is surely easier to influence it from 
the inside than from the outside, but, 
eventually, it is unclear whether Europeans can 
really influence China at all. Europe’s 
uncoordinated response to the AIIB and 
China’s ability to divide and rule suggest that it 
will be difficult.  
 
Coordination will partly depend on the final 
list of EU Member States that join the AIIB. 
The fact that no EU country has taken an open 
stance against the AIIB could suggest that 
most are still considering an application, even 
at a later stage. They are probably weighing the 
costs and benefits of membership. The main 
cost is financial, as countries have to provide 
capital to the AIIB. For many countries, like 
Belgium, finding fresh capital is not easy in 
these dire financial times. Another cost relates 
to the relationship with the United States. 
Many small EU Member States do not want or 
simply cannot afford to confront the United 
States as openly as major Member States. In 
this case, a change in the US position could 
ease the decision for some governments. 
Among the benefits, there is surely a matter of 
prestige – but that applies mostly to the 
‘founding member’ status, which ended on 31 
March. A more tangible benefit relates to the 
possible contracts that European companies 
could obtain as a result of infrastructure 
projects launched by the AIIB. The problem 
with this, however, is that smaller EU Member 
States do not have many companies that can 
undertake such major projects, let alone 
compete with German, French or Chinese 
companies. If anything, companies from 
smaller countries could get some marginal 
benefits through subcontracts. In a less direct 
manner, some EU Member States could also 
benefit economically from better relations with 
Beijing, as a result of their political support for 
the AIIB.  
 
As EU countries assess their options vis-à-vis 
the AIIB, some may opt for a middle way. 
Considering that an AIIB membership is so 
costly, some could ask for ‘observer status’, 
which has not yet been put on the table. This 
would be a low-costs, low-benefits option, and 
yet sufficient to keep good relations with 
China. Some Member States could also try to 
pool resources and join as a constituency, 
although this would dilute their influence 
within the AIIB. It is also unclear whether 
China is willing to accept this. Alternatively, 
some Member States could also push for 
European Invest Bank (EIB) membership to 
become an indirect contribution to the AIIB, 
since all EU Member States are represented on 
the EIB’s Board. But it is equally unclear how 
China would react to this. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the first time, China is showing leadership 
and persuasion in creating a new multilateral 
institution that could be globally acceptable. 
This is certainly an interesting development, 
and perhaps a sign of changing times. It could 
announce the end of our Western-centric 
order. This will take time, however. To begin 
with, the AIIB must first get to work and 
prove its effectiveness on the ground. Funding 
infrastructure development in Asia is a fine but 
highly complex task.  
 
Furthermore, the power transition will 
inevitably be resisted and challenged, mostly by 
the United States. It is too soon to tell whether 
China’s multilateral turn is real or not, and 
whether this could lead to an alternative 
multilateral order. After all, it took several 
decades to set up the current multilateral 
system, and it is still not exempt from criticism. 
In fact, continuity rather than rupture is likely 
for the foreseeable future. China’s leadership is 
surely smart enough to understand that the 
current ‘liberal order’ has its own value, 
 7 
 
whereas Western governments should perhaps 
recognize more openly the status quo’s limits 
and pitfalls. If China received more power in the 
WB and ADB, for instance, it could become 
more actively involved and, as a result, become 
the main advocate for deep co-operation with 
the AIIB.  
 
Perhaps Europeans could lead the way in 
reforming the ‘liberal order’, not to 
‘accommodate’ China but rather to safeguard 
and restore the legitimacy of the multilateral 
system. Indeed, as Europe seeks to protect itself 
from further marginalization in the international 
system, it has essentially two options: promote 
multilateral norms and practices, or act 
collectively, mainly through the EU. 
Unfortunately, the AIIB story suggests that 
Europeans still hold their privileges dear in 
established multilateral institutions, while also 
letting themselves be easily divided. 
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